The latest figures

There is no single figure for Russia's military spending. There are at least two measures — the federal budget's National Defence chapter and SIPRI's estimate of military expenditure — and each comes as a plan before the year and as an outturn after it. The table shows the latest figure of each kind, with what it measures and how firm it is.

MeasureYear₽ bn% of GDPStatus
National Defence chapter20213,573.62.7actual: the last full outturn published
National Defence chapter202513,574.86.3allocation in the budget as amended in November 2025
National Defence chapter202612,121.05.2allocation in the budget law
National Defence chapter202717,147.46.9draft submitted to the State Duma, 30 September 2026
SIPRI military expenditure202515,963.67.5SIPRI estimate, built on the amended 2025 budget

The shares use Rosstat's GDP for 2021 and 2025, the GDP assumed by the 2026 budget law for 2026 and the finance ministry's September 2026 forecast for 2027; SIPRI uses the IMF's GDP. In dollars, SIPRI puts Russia's 2025 spending at $190.4 billion at that year's exchange rates, the third-largest military budget in the world. Any dollar figure for a plan depends on the rate chosen: at the ministry's own forecast of ₽87.4 to the dollar, ₽17.15 trillion in 2027 is about $196 billion.

Why different sources give different numbers

Four distinctions explain most of the disagreement between published figures.

Figures that circulate without a stated definition, period and status are best treated as unverified.

Russia's military spending over time

The two series below are kept apart on purpose. They measure different things, and joining them would create a jump that never happened.

SIPRI military expenditure, 2000–2025. SIPRI's series for Russia begins in 1992; the table starts in 2000. Rouble amounts are at current prices, dollar amounts at each year's exchange rate.

Year₽ bn$ bn% of GDPStatus
2000259.69.23.3SIPRI estimate
2001340.811.73.5SIPRI estimate
2002437.113.93.8SIPRI estimate
2003521.017.03.7SIPRI estimate
2004603.821.03.3SIPRI estimate
2005773.227.33.3SIPRI estimate
2006938.634.53.2SIPRI estimate
20071,113.743.53.1SIPRI estimate
20081,396.356.23.1SIPRI estimate
20091,635.751.53.9SIPRI estimate
20101,783.258.73.6SIPRI estimate
20112,063.770.23.4SIPRI estimate
20122,512.581.53.7SIPRI estimate
20132,812.988.43.9SIPRI figure
20143,250.584.74.1SIPRI figure
20154,047.666.44.9SIPRI figure
20164,644.869.35.4SIPRI figure
20173,902.466.94.2SIPRI figure
20183,863.561.63.7SIPRI figure
20194,217.165.13.8SIPRI figure
20204,462.161.94.1SIPRI figure
20214,855.265.93.6SIPRI figure
20227,150.0104.44.6SIPRI estimate
20239,300.0109.25.3SIPRI estimate
202413,827.5149.46.9SIPRI estimate
202515,963.6190.47.5SIPRI estimate

The 2016 peak includes a one-off repayment of defence-industry debt. Between 2021 and 2025 SIPRI's figure rose from 3.6% to 7.5% of GDP; in real terms, in constant 2024 dollars, it grew by 131%.

The federal budget's National Defence chapter, 2011–2029. Actual spending comes from the finance ministry's annual execution data, which start in 2011 in their current classification. Since 2022 the chapter's full outturn has not been published; its total appears only as an allocation.

Year₽ bn% of GDPStatus
20111,516.02.5actual
20121,812.42.7actual
20132,103.62.9actual
20142,479.13.1actual
20153,181.43.8actual
20163,775.34.4actual
20172,852.33.1actual
20182,827.02.7actual
20192,997.42.7actual
20203,168.82.9actual
20213,573.62.7actual
2022——actual not published in full
2023——actual not published in full
2024——actual not published in full
202513,574.86.3allocation, budget as amended; actual not published in full
202612,121.05.2allocation, budget law
202717,147.46.9plan, draft budget
202816,607.96.3plan, draft budget
202916,295.85.8plan, draft budget

Shares of GDP for actual years use Rosstat's current estimates. In the last pre-war year, 2021, the chapter took 14.4% of federal spending; the 2025 allocation took 32.1%.

2026: this year's defence budget

The federal budget law for 2026–2028 (No. 426-FZ of 28 November 2025) allocates ₽12,121.0 billion to National Defence, 27.5% of planned federal spending and 5.2% of the GDP the law assumes. That is ₽809.5 billion less than the draft submitted in September 2025, and 10.7% below the amended allocation for 2025, while the social policy chapter grew by ₽735.2 billion between the draft and the law. SIPRI, adding the items its definition includes, estimates planned military expenditure for 2026 at ₽14.9 trillion, or 6.3% of GDP.

The allocation is not a forecast of what will be spent. A law of 26 June 2026 allows the government, within limits, to raise federal spending without amending the budget law, and the finance ministry now expects federal spending of ₽48,527.2 billion in 2026, ₽4.46 trillion more than the law provides. How much of that goes to defence has not been published. The open part of the chapter shows the direction: by 1 July 2026 its working allocation had been raised from ₽2,934.4 billion in the law to ₽3,405.5 billion, and ₽2,241.2 billion of it had been spent, according to the Federal Treasury.

2027: the draft budget

The government submitted the draft budget for 2027–2029 to the State Duma on 30 September 2026. In the finance ministry's accompanying tables, the National Defence chapter is planned at ₽17,147.4 billion in 2027, ₽16,607.9 billion in 2028 and ₽16,295.8 billion in 2029. The 2027 figure is 35.2% of planned federal spending of ₽48,740.4 billion and 6.9% of forecast GDP.

The 2027 plan is 26.9% above the ₽13,512.5 billion that the 2026 budget law had set for 2027, and 41.5% above the 2026 allocation, although actual 2026 spending is likely to exceed its allocation. These are planned figures in a bill the Duma has yet to pass and can amend; they say nothing yet about what will be spent.

Russia's military spending as a share of GDP

By SIPRI's measure, Russia spent 7.5% of GDP on its military in 2025, up from 3.6% in 2021. The National Defence chapter alone was allocated 6.3% of GDP in 2025, against an actual 2.7% in 2021. The 2026 budget law plans 5.2% for the chapter and the 2027 draft 6.9%.

The denominator matters. A plan's share is measured against forecast GDP: if the economy grows more slowly than the ministry expects, the same allocation is a larger share. Rosstat revises past GDP, and SIPRI uses the IMF's figures, so two honest calculations for the same year can differ by a few tenths of a percentage point.

How Russia pays for it

National Defence is the largest chapter of the federal budget, and its growth since 2022 is a large part of why the federal budget has been in deficit every year since the invasion. The money comes from oil and gas revenue; other taxes, such as VAT, raised to 22% in 2026; domestic borrowing through OFZ bonds; and the liquid part of the National Wealth Fund. That chain is the subject of the guide to how Russia finances the war; the gap itself is explained in the guide to the budget deficit and tracked on the deficit indicator page.

What the number means and what it does not

Military spending measures what the state allocates or pays. It does not measure military capability: the same roubles buy less as prices in the defence industry rise, and the published figures do not show how the money is split between pay, equipment and repairs. It does not show how long the war can go on, or whether the economy can sustain it; that depends on revenue, borrowing and reserves, which this monitor follows through the eight indicators of its strength index. Military spending is not one of those eight.

Nor is it the whole cost of the war. SIPRI's estimate leaves out regional governments' spending, such as sign-up bonuses for recruits; the federal budget's spending on occupied Ukrainian territory; and the war's costs to the economy outside the budget. The wider picture is in the Russia war economy overview and the guide Russia's war economy explained.

Sources and methodology

Every figure on this page comes from a primary document, read for this guide:

Percentages of GDP and changes are our own calculations from these figures. SIPRI revises its series every April, and its latest year is based on a budget rather than an outturn. Rosstat revises GDP. This page is updated when a budget law, a draft budget, an execution report or a SIPRI release changes a figure; the review date is at the top.

Frequently asked questions

How much does Russia spend on its military? For 2025, SIPRI estimates ₽15.96 trillion, about $190 billion, or 7.5% of GDP. The narrower National Defence chapter of the budget was allocated ₽13.57 trillion.

What is Russia's defence budget for 2026? The 2026 budget law allocates ₽12.12 trillion to National Defence, 5.2% of the GDP the law assumes. Actual spending is likely to be higher.

How much does Russia plan to spend on defence in 2027? The draft budget submitted on 30 September 2026 plans ₽17.15 trillion for National Defence in 2027, 6.9% of forecast GDP. It is a plan and may change before the law is passed.

What percentage of GDP does Russia spend on defence? About 7.5% in 2025 by SIPRI's measure, and 6.3% for the National Defence chapter alone.

How much has Russia's military spending increased since 2021? SIPRI's figure rose from ₽4.86 trillion in 2021 to ₽15.96 trillion in 2025, and from 3.6% to 7.5% of GDP; in real terms it grew by 131%.

Why do SIPRI and Russian budget numbers differ? SIPRI counts more than the National Defence chapter, including military pensions and paramilitary forces, and it publishes estimates where Russia classifies the figures.