On 28 September Vladimir Putin signed decree No. 700, a single-page act that sets the authorised strength of the Russian armed forces and directs the government to provide the necessary funding. It is the third increase of the year. We read all four of this year's headcount decrees in the official publication and recomputed every step in the series.
“1. To establish the authorised strength of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at 2,441,630 units, including 1,550,500 servicemen. 2. The Government of the Russian Federation is to provide the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation with the federal budget appropriations necessary to implement point 1 of this Decree.”
The decree took effect on the day of signing. It revokes decree No. 419 of 12 June and point 2 of decree No. 526 of 27 July, the two acts that set the previous figures.
The 2026 series, step by step
The series began with decree No. 139 of 4 March: 2,391,770 units, of them 1,502,640 servicemen. Decree No. 419 of 12 June raised both figures by 7,360, to 2,399,130 and 1,510,000. Decree No. 526 of 27 July — issued, its preamble says, “in connection with the creation of military construction subdivisions in the Armed Forces” — set the figures from 1 August at 2,426,130 and 1,535,000: 27,000 more units, 25,000 more servicemen. Now decree No. 700 adds 15,500 to each figure.
From March to the end of September the authorised strength grew by 49,860 units, of them 47,860 servicemen — three increases in seven months. The positions that are not for servicemen have barely changed: they stood at 889,130 in March and June and at 891,130 from August onward. Apart from the 2,000 added with the construction subdivisions, the entire increase this year is in military positions.
The money clause
Decree No. 700 contains no rouble figure, and we compute none: pay, allowances and the cost of equipping a position are not in the document. It does contain point 2, which directs the government to provide the budget appropriations. The March decree that opened the year had no such point; the June increase included one, and it stayed in force until yesterday's decree replaced it with its own. Each increase since June has therefore come with an instruction in force requiring the federal budget to cover it.
The timing matters. Under article 192 of the Budget Code, the government must submit the 2027–2029 draft budget to the State Duma by 1 October — the package that, as Minfin's own text says, is built on a base oil price cut to $50 a barrel and deficits of “around 2% of GDP annually”. The funding instruction arrives two days before the deadline for a plan whose revenue assumptions are being lowered. Whether the submission has happened we cannot check: the Duma's legislative portal has been unreachable from our environment for a fourth day.
Why this is about the ability to pay for the war
Personnel costs are the hardest part of military spending to compress. A procurement contract can be moved to next year; pay and allowances for a filled position cannot, short of cutting the position or the pay. An authorised-strength decree does not spend money by itself — it is permission, not payment — but each increase widens the base on which obligatory spending is calculated, and point 2 requires the federal budget to provide the funds needed to implement it. How Russia finances the war sets out where such obligations end up when revenue does not keep pace.
What this changes in our model
Today — nothing. The decree names no sum, so no number our indicators read has moved. The budget deficit stands at 65 of 100: the rolling twelve-month deficit through August is 7,501 billion roubles, or 3.3% of GDP. The strength index stands at 47.1 of 100, in the stress zone; all eight indicators are on the monitor.
What we do not know
What the raise costs. The decree gives no figure, and a serviceman's full cost to the budget is not a public constant we could multiply by 15,500. We do not compute it.
Whether it is already in the 2027–2029 draft. The bill texts are not available to us; whether the draft budget was built with this headcount or will need an amendment, no document we can read says.
How many positions are filled. Authorised strength is a ceiling, not a count of people. None of the four decrees states actual strength, and no other primary source in this session does either.
Why the March decree carries no funding clause. Decrees No. 419 and No. 700 order the government to fund the raise; decree No. 139 does not. The texts give no explanation.