The Fuse.RUSSIA'S FISCAL BREAKDOWN MONITOR
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How Russia Is Financing the War

This page reads eight economic indicators through the financing of Russia's war. Russian oil and gas budget revenues are the budget's “driver”; Russia's budget deficit is the monitor's “burn rate” when spending exceeds receipts; and Russia's liquid reserve fund is the “buffer” available when revenue and borrowing fall short. The next part of the chain is domestic. Russia's M2 money supply growth helps show when state-owned banks expand credit to carry the deficit, while Russia's inflation rate records the pressure visible in consumer prices. Russia's overdue corporate receivables show unpaid invoices accumulating between companies. Russia's regional budget balance adds the finances of governments that depend heavily on federal transfers, and Russia's rail freight volumes provide a physical check on activity. No single series answers the financing question by itself; together they show which parts of the system are absorbing the burden. For the same eight indicators presented as a broad economic overview, see the economy page.

▸ Russia's Economy

What “war economy” means in this monitor

This page is not a full account of Russia's economy. It uses the same eight indicators this monitor already tracks to show how the war's costs are covered: where the money comes from, what happens when revenue falls short, and where the resulting pressure appears. It measures fiscal capacity; it does not predict the course of the war.

Current financial strength index

STRESS · 46/100

Where government money comes from

Oil and gas revenue is the federal budget's main source of income. When total spending exceeds total revenue, the resulting deficit is covered by the liquid National Wealth Fund, domestic borrowing, or state banks expanding credit. The sections below track each channel in turn.

Russian oil and gas budget revenues

Rolling oil and gas budget revenue over the past year, from monthly finance ministry data, adjusted for inflation and measured against the pre-war baseline.

55% (of the pre-war level · trouble line — 50%) · data Sep 2026 · 10/100 vs pre-war · no change from last month

Russia's budget deficit

Russia's rolling federal budget balance as a share of GDP over the past year, calculated from the finance ministry's monthly reports.

3.2% (of GDP deficit (12-month) · the trouble line is 10%) · data Sep 2026 · 66/100 vs pre-war · no change from last month

Domestic borrowing

When oil and gas revenue and the reserve fund cannot cover the deficit, the government borrows domestically through OFZ bond auctions. The current data model does not track OFZ auction results in real time, so this page does not report a current domestic-borrowing figure. A weak or failed auction can still appear indirectly as a wider deficit or a faster drawdown of the liquid reserve fund. For background on how OFZ placements work, see the OFZ guide.

Russia's liquid National Wealth Fund

The liquid, spendable portion of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, tracked from the finance ministry's own monthly fund statement.

$45.0 bn (liquid · the trouble line is $20 bn) · data Sep 2026 · 27/100 vs pre-war · no change from last month

Russia's M2 money supply growth

Year-on-year growth of Russia's broad money supply, from the central bank's own published series.

+13.2% (vs last year · the trouble line is +30%) · data Sep 2026 · 84/100 vs pre-war · no change from last month

Russia's inflation rate

Russia's annual consumer-price inflation rate, from the national statistics agency's monthly series.

+6.3% (vs last year · the trouble line is +40%) · data Sep 2026 · 95/100 vs pre-war · no change from last month

Russia's regional budget balance

The consolidated balance of Russia's regional government budgets over the past rolling year, from the finance ministry's own monthly reporting.

−₽1.47 trn (consolidated regional balance over 12 months · the trouble line is −₽2.5 trn) · data Sep 2026 · 33/100 vs pre-war · no change from last month

Russia's overdue corporate receivables

The stock of overdue invoices Russian companies have failed to pay each other, from the national statistics agency's monthly economic report.

1.96× (of the pre-war level · trouble line — 2×) · data Aug 2026 · 4/100 vs pre-war · no change from last month

Russia's rail freight volumes

Rolling rail freight tonnage over the past year on Russia's state railway network, a physical-economy signal that is harder to manage than a published ratio.

86% (of the pre-war level · trouble line — 80%) · data Oct 2026 · 32/100 vs pre-war · no change from last month

Latest developments

Methodology and limitations

How we know

Domestic OFZ borrowing is not part of the real-time data model (see “Domestic borrowing” above). Every other channel shown here is drawn directly from primary sources.

Background reading

Frequently asked questions

How is Russia financing the war?
The Fuse's overall index reads 46/100 as of Nov 5, 2026 and is in the STRESS zone. It combines the same eight fiscal and financial-stress indicators that this page examines through the lens of war financing.
Is Russia borrowing heavily to cover war costs?
The current data model does not track domestic OFZ auctions in real time, so this page cannot say how heavily Russia is borrowing now. Any shortfall appears indirectly in the federal deficit or the liquid National Wealth Fund, both of which this monitor tracks directly.
How much of the National Wealth Fund can still be drawn on?
Russia's liquid National Wealth Fund stood at $45.0 bn as of Sep 2026.
How large is the deficit that needs to be financed?
Russia's rolling 12-month federal budget deficit is 3.2% of GDP, data as of Sep 2026.
How dependent is the war budget on oil and gas revenue?
Russian oil and gas budget revenues make up one of the monitor's eight tracked indicators. The latest 12-month reading is 55% of their registered pre-war level, with data as of Sep 2026.