On 20 November BOFIT, the Bank of Finland's institute for emerging economies, devoted its weekly review to a single question: what the growth of military spending has done to the rest of Russia's budget and to its savings. Two calculations carry it. Defence and classified lines together were roughly 40% of federal spending in January–September and rose by nearly 30% year on year, while everything else rose by 6% against the same 6% rise in prices. And of the $720 billion of gold and foreign exchange reserves reported at the end of October, the central bank actually controls about $412 billion — inside which sits $44 billion of liquid National Wealth Fund assets. We read the review in session and recomputed both.
The second figure is the one our own series tracks. Our reading of the finance ministry's October statement puts the NWF's liquid part at $44.4 billion; BOFIT, reading the same file, says $44 billion. The difference is rounding: the review prints whole billions, and $44.4 billion to the nearest billion is $44 billion.
Three numbers, and only one of them can pay a bill
The $720 billion is the number that gets quoted as Russia's war chest. BOFIT breaks it into its parts, and they add up: about $290 billion of gold, about $30 billion of claims on the IMF — SDRs and the reserve position — and about $400 billion of assets actually denominated in foreign currency. The last breakdown of those currency assets was published in early 2022, and at that time 70% of them were held in the currencies of countries that have since imposed sanctions. On that basis the review estimates that
an estimated 30% of the foreign-currency assets and 60% of the total gold and foreign exchange reserves are actually under the control of the Russian central bank.
Three levels, then, not one. The headline stock is $720 billion. The part the central bank can reach is around $412 billion. And the part the federal budget can actually spend is the liquid National Wealth Fund — $44 billion, about 6% of the headline, because the fund's liquid assets sit inside the central bank's reserves but belong to the finance ministry, and the rest of the reserves do not.
The review is explicit about one caution, and it runs in the same direction: the gold is counted as controlled because it is held in Russia, not because it can be sold. The central bank is itself sanctioned, its scope to sell gold is limited, and many of the sanctioning countries restrict importing Russian gold. Physical holdings fell by only about 3% this year.
What we recomputed
The components check out: $290bn plus $30bn plus $400bn is the $720bn stated. The two figures in the review's own conclusion, though, do not quite meet. Taking its method literally — all the gold, plus the 30% of currency assets not held in sanctioning currencies — gives $290bn plus $120bn, about $410 billion, or 57% of the headline, against the 60% stated in the same sentence. The difference is roughly the size of the IMF position, which the $412 billion appears to exclude and the 60% to include. It is a small gap and it points the cautious way: the controlled share is, if anything, slightly below the figure given.
One visible slip is worth naming so that nobody carries it forward: the review puts the ten-month federal deficit at “5.2 billion” roubles, roughly 2% of GDP, which at that share and against the ministry's own 7.3 trillion year-end forecast can only mean trillions. We take our deficit reading from the ministry file directly: a rolling twelve-month deficit of 6.9 trillion roubles through October, 3.0% of GDP on our estimate of the denominator.
The fund, measured against February 2022
The whole National Wealth Fund stood at 13 trillion roubles at the end of October, 5.6% of GDP; the review puts the part held in readily accessible liquid form at some 30%, and our own arithmetic on the same file gives about 27%. The rest is shares, corporate bonds and long-term bank deposits: the state's majority stake in Sberbank, holdings in RZD, DOM.RF, VTB and Gazprombank, bonds of Rostec and the road company Avtodor. Four days ago we described the fund buying 25-year ferry bonds at 0.01% a year — that is what joining the illiquid side looks like in practice.
Measured against the war's beginning rather than against last year, the liquid part has gone from about 9.7 trillion roubles in February 2022, 6% of GDP, to about 3.6 trillion, 1.5% of GDP. About 500 billion roubles were taken out of the fund this year. Our own series carries the same collapse in dollars: $44.4 billion now against $113.5 billion just before the invasion.
What the other 60% of the budget did
The spending half of the review is the same argument from the other end. About a third of the published allocations for January–September do not show what the money was spent on; the review treats classified lines plus defence as a rough floor for war-related spending, and notes that the true total is probably higher, because war spending also sits in other chapters. That floor grew by nearly 30% year on year. Everything else grew by 6% — which, with prices up by the same 6%, means it did not grow at all.
Some chapters did worse than stand still. Housing and municipal services fell 15% year on year over the nine months; federal healthcare spending fell 8%, and the federal budget now covers just 23% of total healthcare spending. The federal share of financing social expenditure has fallen below 30% for the first time.
There is one sign of a ceiling. In July–September the war-related lines themselves grew by just 6%, after the surges earlier in the year. The same deceleration shows in the headline figures the review cites from the ministry's preliminary report: spending was up 13% year on year over ten months, but in October alone it was up 2%.
Why it matters
Two readings of Russia's capacity to keep paying rest on numbers this review takes apart. The first is that the budget is still growing: it is, but only the war part of it is, and everything else has been flat in real terms for a year while two chapters were cut outright. The second is the cushion. A reserve stock of $720 billion sounds like years of cover. The part the central bank can reach is a little over half of it, most of that is gold it is constrained from selling, and the part the finance ministry can actually spend on a deficit is $44 billion — against a deficit its own forecast puts at 7.3 trillion roubles this year.
Neither calculation is Russian, and neither is a published official figure; both are BOFIT's, built on official components. What we can confirm from our own reading of the primary file is the number at the bottom of the ladder, and it is the one that matters: the liquid part of the fund, $44.4 billion, which we track daily.