Decree № 604 was published on 24 August without explanation. It was not publicly identified as a policy tool until the 27th, at the first meeting of Manturov's new subcommission. It allows the state to strip an owner of control over an enterprise if the owner failed to protect or promptly restore a critical-infrastructure site.
What exactly the decree allows
The text allows the government, acting on a presidential instruction, to place all or part of an economic entity's property under temporary management, including its securities, stakes in companies and property rights. The grounds are a failure to take security measures or to take them on time, a breach of security requirements, or the creation of a threat to a site's operation. It separately lists the “identified ineffectiveness of measures aimed directly at stopping the threat of attacks using unmanned aircraft”, as well as a failure to restore the site's operation or to do so on time.
Unless another manager is named, Rosimushchestvo, the federal property agency, takes charge. It receives the owner's powers — except the power to dispose of the property — and must carry out an inventory. Management ends as it begins: by government decision. Its costs come from the asset's own income:
“Expenses connected with the temporary management of the property are financed from income generated by its use.”
Who it reaches
The list of sites in paragraph 6 is open-ended: energy, industry, communications, utilities, transport and logistics infrastructure, and life-support facilities — “as well as other sites of particular importance”. According to Manturov, Minpromtorg has already drawn up a list of 167 logistics and trade sites. The list is unpublished.
The difference from its predecessor, decree № 302 of April 2023, is fundamental. That decree covered property belonging to people from “unfriendly” states. Decree № 604 defines those subject to it through competition law, which also covers Russian owners. Manturov presents it as a disciplinary measure: the provision “is preventive and disciplinary in nature” and should apply “when businesses genuinely sabotage the state's instructions”.
Third document in a week, and the first stick
In one week, the government issued three documents concerning businesses hit by attacks. Decree № 1074 deferred taxes for those affected by the attacks on RVB warehouses, with the company itself drawing up the list. Decree № 1072, also dated 25 August, does the same for Crimea and Sevastopol. Social contributions for June–December are deferred to 27 January 2027, followed by a year of instalments for tourism SMEs. For a wider set of industries, the June–August contributions are deferred to 1 October, followed by six months of instalments. On-site audits are suspended until 30 December and penalties until 31 December. Once again, the beneficiary lists are drawn up not by the tax service but by the regional governments of Crimea and Sevastopol.
The first two decrees offer relief: the state postpones its own receipts. Decree № 604 applies pressure. The owner bears the cost of protection and restoration or risks losing control of the asset. Together, the three measures form the machinery described in our piece on the subcommission: private capital is increasingly being billed for the war's costs inside Russia.
What this means for our model
Directly, nothing: we measure money, not legal instruments. Indirectly, the effects could reach two indicators after a lag of months. Overdue receivables — 4 out of 100, the worst of the eight — could grow faster if mandatory security spending squeezes working capital. The deficit score — 65 out of 100 — could, if anything, improve if private money replaces budget money for restoration. The rest are on the monitor.
What we do not know
The decree sets no time limit for temporary management, appeal procedure, duty to notify the owner, criteria for “sufficient measures” or “timely restoration”, or compensation of any kind. There is no implementing act governing how decisions are made. It is unknown whether the decree has been applied even once or whether the 167 sites include private assets. For № 1072, neither the number of taxpayers nor the sums involved have been disclosed.