At nine in the morning on 27 August, the Russian government published decree № 1077 and order № 2284-r, both dated 26 August. Together, they create a permanent subcommission “on ensuring the uninterrupted functioning of particular sectors of the economy” within the government commission on strengthening the economy's resilience under sanctions.
Who sits on it
The chair is First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov. There are three deputy chairs, and one of them is Anatoly Kontsevoy, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. The other two are Deputy Prime Ministers Grigorenko and Novak.
The membership runs to twenty people. It includes Defence Minister Andrei Belousov, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, tax service head Daniil Egorov, customs head Valery Pikalev, state reserve agency head Dmitry Gogin, and Boris Stezhka, who runs the office of the Military-Industrial Commission's collegium. The ministers of industry, energy, transport, agriculture, construction, digital development, economic development and emergencies also sit on it.
What it is allowed to do
The statute of the subcommission lists its powers. One of them is worth quoting in full:
“…to recommend to organisations and other persons that they take decisions to change the order, the deadlines and the size of obligations, and carry out other measures, in order to preserve and improve the uninterrupted functioning of particular sectors of the economy.”
And separately: “within the subcommission, in accordance with its decisions, headquarters for particular sectors of the economy are formed”.
Its tasks include assessing the protection of critical infrastructure, overseeing its timely restoration, and “minimising the negative social and economic consequences connected with the disruption of enterprises”.
Why this is about paying for the war
Because it is the institutional answer to something we already measure in money. Strikes on enterprises inside Russia leave revenue uncollected — three days ago we wrote about the tax deferral for businesses hit by attacks on the RVB warehouses. That was a decision in one case. The subcommission is a standing forum for preparing such decisions, and the General Staff and the defence minister have seats at the table.
The wording deserves a precise reading: the subcommission recommends; it does not order, and the text gives no legal force to a recommendation. But its membership shows the weight the government has given it.
What our model reads from this
Nothing. Our eight indicators measure money — revenue, deficit, reserves, freight — not the machinery that manages it. The closest is the deficit at 65 out of 100, currently the healthiest of the eight; the rest are on the monitor.
We hold the story as context. If the subcommission starts recommending large-scale rescheduling of obligations, it will show up in our numbers months later — through the deficit and overdue receivables.
What we do not know
The subcommission's decisions are not published, so we will not see what it recommends or to whom. Nothing defines what follows if someone does not act on a “recommendation”. The text does not say which sectors get headquarters first or when the subcommission meets. Nor does it say whether the powers cover obligations owed to the budget or only those between private parties.