Decree № 1097, signed on 28 August and published the next day, moves two dates in the exceptions to Russia's fuel export ban by exactly one month. It took effect on publication, two days before the first date it moves. The government says diesel, marine fuel and gasoils exported from Russia by their direct producers remain barred through 30 September.

The whole decree is two dates

The operative part replaces four words and nothing else:

“(a) in point 4, replace the words ‘from 1 September 2026’ with the words ‘from 1 October 2026’; (b) in point 5, replace the words ‘through 31 August 2026’ with the words ‘through 30 September 2026’.”

The points it rewrites belong to decree № 954 of 30 July 2026, which banned exports of motor gasoline, diesel fuel, marine fuel and other gasoils — including volumes bought on the exchange — from 1 August 2026 through 31 January 2027. That end date is untouched. What changed is the width of the exception carved into the ban.

A narrow door, and a wide one

Decree № 954 lists fifteen exceptions to its ban. Two concern diesel, and their scope differs:

The narrow exception was due to expire on 31 August and the wide one to open on 1 September: a handover from a quota-bound channel to an open one. Decree № 1097 postpones that handover by a month. Through September, only diesel moving through the quota-bound intergovernmental channel may lawfully leave; the wide door now opens on 1 October.

The government's own announcement describes the same act from the other side:

“A decree has been signed extending the ban on exports of diesel, marine fuel and gasoils taken out of Russia by their direct producers. The restriction will remain in force through 30 September 2026 inclusive. The decision was taken to maintain stability in the domestic fuel market.”

Three of the fifteen exceptions are secret

The last three exceptions in decree № 954 carry no text. The other twelve cover humanitarian shipments, transit, ships' stores, supplies to Russian military formations abroad and supplies to Russian organizations at Baikonur and on Svalbard. The last three read, in full, “for official use only”. A fifth of the permitted export categories is therefore not public, and what leaves the country through them cannot be checked against the decree.

Why a fuel decision reaches the budget twice

Fuel that is not exported earns no export revenue and pays no export duty. Fuel kept at home acts on domestic prices. Those prices determine the damper, a subsidy paid to refiners that appears as a negative line within oil and gas revenue. We took that line apart on 25 August: the payment shrinks as domestic prices rise toward their thresholds and falls to zero once they cross them. The two channels pull in opposite directions, and this decree settles neither. Minfin's monthly file, not this text, will show which one dominated in August and September.

What this means for our model

Oil and gas budget revenues score 14 out of 100, the second-worst of the eight, and measure the level against 2021 rather than the rate against last year. This decree does not move that number today: it sets no volumes and transfers no money. It matters because both channels above feed into that indicator with a lag, and because a one-month postponement decided two days before the handover suggests the government is reassessing its fuel market week by week rather than following a fixed plan. The rest is on the monitor.

What we do not know

The decree gives no volumes, no estimate of export earnings foregone and no explanation of why the postponement is one month rather than two. It does not say whether the handover will be put off again on 30 September. Whether the damper was zeroed out in August will be in Minfin's data in early September, not in this text. What the three secret exceptions permit has not been published.